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Blinson v. State and the Continued Erosion of the Public
Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina*
INTRODUCrION
In 2004, the North Carolina General Assembly approved
legislation that provided Dell Inc. ("Dell") with more than $242
million in economic development incentives.1 In 2007, Google Inc.
("Google") was also approved to receive up to $90 million over the
next thirty years More recently, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. was
approved to receive $25 million over the next ten years.3  It is
estimated that the total amount of economic development incentives
given toward eight megaprojects by local North Carolina
governments in the last decade exceeded $700 million.4 An opinion
poll released in August 2005 showed a majority of North Carolinians
favoring such tax credits and other economic incentives to attract
employers to the state.' These tax breaks, however, have sparked a
controversial debate in the public sphere.6 Although opinions vary
* Copyright © 2009 by Anne C. Choe.
1. Plaintiff Appellants' Brief at 4-5, Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 651 S.E.2d
268 (2007) (No. COA06-1258).
2. Op-Ed., States Need Gumption to End Economic Incentives Game, ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN-TIMES (N.C.), Dec. 6, 2007, at B4.
3. James Romoser, Two May Get Grants: They are Among Few that Qualify,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Sept. 12, 2007, at Bi.
4. Richard Craver, N.C. Learning How to Deal: Confidential Documents Show How
State Has Played the Incentives Game to Lure Companies with Jobs, Capital Investment,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Aug. 14, 2005, at Al. Southern states appear to be offering
the most in the form of economic development incentives. See John F. Sugg, The Folly of
Southern Hospitality: Dixie Leads the Way in Lavish Corporate Subsidies. As Other Parts
of the Country Follow Suit, its Time to Ask Whether Such Incentives Work, REASON, May
1, 2007, at 38. Georgia offered Kia Motors America $420 million in incentives; North
Carolina offered This End Up Furniture $230 million; and Mississippi agreed to pay $296
million in incentives to Toyota Motor Corporation. Id. at 38-40.
5. Sabine Vollmer, Poll Sparks More Debate About State Tax Breaks: Boosters,
Critics at Odds Over Results, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 19, 2005, at 1D.
The poll commissioned by the North Carolina Economic Developers Association showed
sixty-two percent of 600 registered voters support the economic development incentives.
However, critics have argued that the poll was designed to produce answers the North
Carolina Economic Developers Association wanted to obtain to garner public support for
economic development incentive packages. Id.
6. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 4; James Romoser, Policy Set for Major Change:
Legislators May Reverse Bill's Veto, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Sept. 9, 2007, at Al;
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greatly about the appropriateness of these economic development
incentives, it is important to remember that a legal structure has been
created under the North Carolina Constitution to govern the granting
of public monies to lure businesses into the state.
The debate over economic development incentives was further
amplified in June 2005 when, in Blinson v. State,7 Robert F. Orr, a
former Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, representing
the North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, challenged the
incentives given to Dell to build a manufacturing plant near Winston-
Salem. The Wake County Superior Court dismissed the complaint
and held the incentives did not violate the North Carolina public
purpose doctrine, which mandates public tax revenues to be used only
for public purposes.8 This Recent Development analyzes the 2007
decision by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina ruling on the
legality of the Dell incentive package, affirming the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.9  The court of appeals
unanimously rejected the constitutional challenge of economic
development incentives under the North Carolina public purpose
doctrine embodied in the North Carolina Constitution. 10
The term "economic development incentives," as used in this
Recent Development, refers to cash or near-cash assistance used to
attract corporations to the state.11 Examples of near-cash assistance
commonly used by local governments of North Carolina include
credits under the state's corporate income tax, tax refunds on sales
tax, and reimbursement for worker training costs.
12
This Recent Development will argue that the holding in Blinson
demonstrates an improper application of the North Carolina public
Vollmer, supra note 5 (highlighting differing public opinions regarding the use of
economic development incentives in North Carolina).
7. Complaint & Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App.
328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007) (No. 05 CVS 8378), available at http://www.ncicl.org/assets/
uploads/brief/2005.06.23-dell-complaint-w-exhibits.pdf.
8. Id. at *14; see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
9. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 330, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
10. Id.
11. See Timothy J. Bartik, Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives,
36 GROWTH AND CHANGE 139, 140 (2005) (defining economic incentives as cash or near-
cash assistance).
12. Jonathan B. Cox & Lynn Bonner, Tire Makers Win State Incentives: A New Law
that Broadens the Scope of Industrial Policy Makes Way for as Much as $60 Million to
Improve N.C. Facilities, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 12, 2007, at 1A
(outlining the incentive package given to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., which includes
refunds on sales tax and payments for worker training costs); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-129.64 (2007) (authorizing tax credits for major computer manufacturing facilities).
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purpose doctrine and was instead a decision based primarily upon
improper judicial restraint. The Blinson court correctly stated the law
of the public purpose doctrine but incorrectly applied the law when
analyzing the constitutionality of the economic development
incentives. This Recent Development will proceed in four parts.
First, it will detail the North Carolina legislation enacted to promote
economic development and the associated Dell incentive package.
Second, this Recent Development will describe the Blinson court's
interpretation and application of the public purpose doctrine relating
to economic development incentives. In doing so, it will address
applicable North Carolina precedent in the area of the public purpose
doctrine in detail, including analysis of Mitchell v. North Carolina
Industrial Development Financing Authority,3 Madison Cablevision,
Inc. v. City of Morganton,4 and Maready v. City of Winston-Salem.5
Third, this piece will analyze the court's incorrect application of the
public purpose doctrine due to departure from precedent and
improper deference to the legislature. Finally, this Recent
Development will discuss the continued broadening of the scope of
the public purpose doctrine as reflected in Blinson and the
implications of this expansion.
I. THE COMPUTER LEGISLATION AND ITS CHALLENGES
Dell received incentives pursuant to the 2004 amendments to
Chapter 105 of the North Carolina General Statutes ("Computer
Legislation"). 6  The legislature enacted these amendments to
13. 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
14. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
15. 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996).
16. See Act of Nov. 4, 2004 (Extra Session), ch. 105, sec. 1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 1-7
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-129.60 to .66 (2005)); Act of Nov. 4, 2004 (Extra
Session), ch. 105, sec. 2, § 105-129.4, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 7, 7-8 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT § 105-129.4 (2005)); Act of Nov. 4, 2004 (Extra Session), ch. 105, sec. 3, § 105-
164.14(j)(2)-(3), 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 8, 8-9 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-
164.14(j)(2)-(3) (2005)); Act of Nov. 4, 2004 (Extra Session), ch. 105, sec. 4, § 105-259(b)
2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 9, 9 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-259(b) (2005)). Article 3A,
the Bill Lee Act, was repealed on January 1, 2007. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.2A(a)
(2007). It was replaced with Article 3J, the Replacement of Bill Lee Act ("Replacement
Act"). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-129.80 to .89 (2007). The Replacement Act streamlined
and continued many of the credits for industries eligible under the Bill Lee Act, including
technology companies. The new law went into effect on January 1, 2007, and contains a
sunset provision through January 1, 2011. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.82(a) (2007).
Article 3G, the article specifically created to authorize the bulk of the Dell incentive
package, contains a sunset provision through January 1, 2020. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
129.66 (2007). Thus, the Dell incentive package will provide at least fifteen years of tax
incentives to the corporation.
[Vol. 87
2009] PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
"enhance existing tax incentives and to provide a tax credit for certain
major computer manufacturing facilities."17  The North Carolina
General Assembly explicitly laid out seven purposes, purportedly all
public purposes, for the enactment of the Computer Legislation.
8
The purposes focused on developing North Carolina's computer
manufacturing and distribution industry through tax policies and
programs that encourage companies to locate in the state.19
Shortly after the passage of the Computer Legislation, the
Forsyth County Board of Commissioners and the City of Winston-
17. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 330, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355,661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
18. Act of Nov. 4, 2004 (Extra Session), ch. 105, § 1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204, 1, 1-2
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT § 105-129.60 (2005)). The General Assembly stated:
(1) It is the policy of the State to stimulate economic activity and to create and
maintain sustainable jobs for the citizens of the State in strategically important
industries.
(2) Both short-term and long-term economic trends at the regional, State, national,
and international levels have made the successful implementation of the State's
economic development policies and programs both more critical and more
challenging; in particular, national trade policies and the resulting impact on
domestic competitiveness have made the retention of manufacturing jobs more
difficult at a time of transition in the national, State, and regional economies.
(3) Manufacturing employment in the State has been disproportionately affected
by trade policies and global economic trends, resulting in the loss of jobs by many
in the State's capable industrial workforce.
(4) Computer manufacturing and distribution has been an important industry for
the State and has prospered in this State due to our strong and productive
workforce, focused worker training programs, research capabilities, tradition of
innovation, and concentration of companies.
(5) The computer manufacturing and distribution industry will remain a vital part
of the world's, nation's, and State's future economy as society becomes more
dependent on advanced computer technology.
(6) It is the intent of the State to encourage the sustainability of this industry
cluster in this State and to encourage the maintenance and growth of computer
manufacturing and distribution employment in the State through tax policies,
investments in training capacity, and other policies and programs.
(7) The State must be an innovative leader in creating policies and programs that
encourage the maintenance of manufacturing jobs in this country and State and in
the development of efforts to support manufacturers during the transitional period
as they adapt to rapidly changing global conditions.
19. Id.
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Salem adopted local resolutions authorizing the use of an economic
development incentive package to attract Dell to Winston-Salem.
Attracted by the package, Dell subsequently announced its plan to
build a major computer manufacturing facility in the county."0 In the
agreement detailing Dell's plans to locate its facility in Forsyth
County, Dell committed to create at least 1,700 jobs at an average
wage of $28,000 per year and to make a capital investment of at least
$100 million.2' The agreement asserted various public benefits
including "job creation, economic diversification and stimulus and
training in technology, and computer assembly and manufacturing
skills. 22  Despite the fact that Dell's plan proposed an
overwhelmingly positive impact on Forsyth County, the plan
encountered resistance at its inception. 3 Much of the dispute over
the Dell economic development incentive package arose from the fact
that the plan amounted to an astounding $242 million in state and
local tax incentives.2 4
The objections to the Dell incentive package were not novel
ones. Since states and localities first began providing economic
development incentives to businesses to attract them to the state,
taxpayers have brought lawsuits challenging their legality under state
constitution public purpose doctrines .2  These taxpayer lawsuits
attack the use of tax incentives and other forms of public subsidies
that provide financial benefit to private businesses while burdening
states, cities, or counties through foregone tax collection that would
otherwise fund schools and other public services. 6 Present in nearly
every state constitution, public purpose doctrines seek to ensure that
20. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 331,651 S.E.2d at 272.
21. Id. at 333, 651 S.E.2d at 273.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Complaint & Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 7, at 1-2;
Craver, supra note 4 (citing critics of the Dell incentive packages).
24. See Plaintiff Appellants' Brief, supra note 1, at 4-5.
25. See, e.g., Hawkins v. City of Greenfield, 230 N.E.2d 396, 396 (Ind. 1967); Brady v.
City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 701-02 (Iowa 1993); In re Application of Okla. Dev.
Fin. Auth. ex rel. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 89 P.3d 1075, 1075 (Okla. 2004).
26. See Gregory W. Fox, Note, Public Finance and the West Side Stadium: The Future
of Stadium Subsidies in New York, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 477, 480 (2005). See id. at 507 for a
thorough discussion of the evolution of the public purpose doctrine.
The public purpose doctrine was originally designed by state legislatures to curb
corruption and exploitation of the public by legislators and railroad developers
during the late 1800s. The public concern during that period was that tax dollars




taxpayer dollars are spent on projects that provide a public benefit,
not a benefit to private entities.27 North Carolina has such a doctrine
in article V, section 2(1) of its constitution which states, "[t]he power
of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for
public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or
contracted away. '2 Furthermore, article V, section 2(7) states, "[t]he
General Assembly may enact laws whereby the State, any county, city
or town, and any other public corporation may contract with and
appropriate money to any person, association, or corporation for the
accomplishment of public purposes only.
29
II. PUBLIC PURPOSE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE CASES
In Blinson, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina interpreted
the public purpose doctrine as applied to the use of economic
development incentive packages in North Carolina. ° In order to
understand Blinson, one must look to precedent used by the North
Carolina courts. To guide its analysis, the Blinson court began with a
case decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1989-
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton.31  Madison
Cablevision is the controlling case for interpreting the public purpose
doctrine in North Carolina.32 The case involved a challenge to a
North Carolina statute that authorized cities to "finance, acquire,
construct, own, and operate a cable television system."33  The
Madison Cablevision court stated, "[t]he initial responsibility for
determining what is and what is not a public purpose rests with the
27. See Michael E. Libonati, The Law of intergovernmental Relations: IVHS
Opportunities and Constraints, 22 TRANSP. L. J. 225, 239 (1994) (stating the public purpose
doctrine "commits state courts to reviewing the actions of state and local government units
to appraise whether the challenged undertaking primarily benefits the public rather than
the private sector").
28. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
29. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(7).
30. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 330, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
31. 325 N.C. 632, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989) (addressing the constitutionality of the North
Carolina General Statutes which authorize the financing, acquisition, construction,
ownership, and operation of a cable television system).
32. The Supreme Court of North Carolina continues to utilize Madison Cablevision in
determining the constitutionality of government expenditures under the public purpose
clause. See, e.g., Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 354 N.C. 336, 339, 554 S.E.2d
331, 333 (2001); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 722, 467 S.E.2d 615, 624
(1996).
33. Madison Cablevision, 325 N.C. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 201.
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legislature; its determinations are entitled to great weight."34 The
court also noted that there is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute.35  However, the "ultimate
determination of whether the activity or enterprise is for a purpose
forbidden by the Constitution of the state" lies with the court.36 In
order to strike a balance between these two seemingly inapposite
tenets, the Madison Cablevision court attempted to find solid legal
footing by focusing on the ultimate benefit of the statute authorizing
cities to own and operate cable television systems. Madison
Cablevision established "[t]wo guiding principles ... for determining
that a particular undertaking by a municipality is for a public purpose:
(1) it involves a reasonable connection with the convenience and
necessity of the particular municipality; and (2) the activity benefits
the public generally, as opposed to special interests or persons.
3 7
In describing this rule of application, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina stated:
Often public and private interests are so co-mingled that it is
difficult to determine which predominates. It is clear, however,
that for a use to be public its benefits must be in common and
not for particular persons, interests, or estates; the ultimate net
gain or advantage must be the public's as contradistinguished
from that of an individual or private entity.38
The court further stated that it had not specifically defined "public
purpose" and, therefore, will determine whether the purported action
is constitutional based on the particular circumstances of each case.39
Thus, in Madison Cablevision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
established how a reviewing court determines whether a state or local
government action is constitutional under the public purpose clause:
a court must give legislative determinations "great weight," but the
court must make the ultimate determination of whether an activity is
34. Id. at 644-45, 386 S.E.2d at 206 (1989) (citations omitted).
35. Id. (quoting In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 57, 296 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1982)).
36. Id. at 645, 386 S.E.2d at 206 (citations omitted). The standard to be applied by a
reviewing court is de novo. If the legislature has declared an act or expenditure to be for a
public purpose, its conclusions are given "great weight" and the action is presumed to be
constitutional. Id. However, this is not conclusive, and the court must make its own
independent legal determination of whether the act is in violation of the public purpose
clause. Id.
37. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207 (internal citations omitted).
38. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Martin v. N.C. Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175




constitutional through application of the two-prong test.4" The North
Carolina courts have consistently used the two distinct prongs of the
Madison Cablevision test in subsequent North Carolina cases.4'
The Blinson court also relied on Maready v. Winston-Salem,42
which outlined how the public purpose doctrine is specifically applied
to economic development incentives.43 In Maready, a Supreme Court
of North Carolina case from 1996, the plaintiffs challenged a North
Carolina statute authorizing twenty-four economic development
incentive projects given by Winston-Salem and Forsyth Counties
where the projected package totaled approximately $13 million."
The counties granted the incentives to private companies for job
training, site preparation and upgrading, and parking facilities.45 The
Maready court held that the statute authorizing economic
development incentive programs was constitutional under the public
purpose doctrine.46  The court clearly delineated the Madison
Cablevision two-prong test of determining whether a municipality has
acted with a public purpose, and it concluded that the challenged
statute furthered a public purpose after applying the two-prong test,
as follows.47 In addressing the first prong, the court stated that an
action "involves a reasonable connection with the convenience and
necessity of the particular municipality"48 if similar action has been
held by the court in the past to be within the scope of permissible
government involvement.49 The court concluded the statute passed
this first prong because "economic development has long been
recognized as a proper governmental function."5 In addressing the
40. Id.
41. See Michael McKnight, Comment, Don't Know What a Slide Rule is for: The Need
for a Precise Definition of Public Purpose in North Carolina in the Wake of Kelo v. City of
New London, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 291,309-12 (2006).
42. 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996).
43. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 337-38, 651 S.E.2d 268, 275-76 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
44. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 618-19. Plaintiffs challenged N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 158-7.1, the statute which authorizes local governments to make economic
development incentive grants to private corporations. Id. Pursuant to the statute, the
economic development incentives shall have the purpose of increasing the "population,
taxable property, agricultural industries and business prospects .... " N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 158-7.1(a) (2007).
45. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 618-19.
46. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627.
47. Id. at 722, 467 S.E.2d at 624; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 632, 646, 386 S.E.2d 200,
207 (1989).
49. Maready, 342 N.C. at 722, 467 S.E.2d at 624.
50. Id. at 723, 467 S.E.2d at 624.
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second prong, the issue most contentious in these types of cases, the
Maready court stated that activities are considered constitutional "so
long as they primarily benefit the public and not a private party."'"
The court concluded the statute passed this second prong because the
"self-proclaimed end is to 'increase the population, taxable property,
agricultural industries and business prospects of any city or county' ";
the "natural consequences" from the statute will yield "net public
benefit"; and the statute "should create a more stable local
economy."52  The Maready court held the economic development
incentives given to the private corporations were constitutional by
reasoning that the "public advantages are not indirect, remote, or
incidental; rather, they are directly aimed at furthering the general
economic welfare of the people of the communities affected.
'" 53
In its analysis of whether the economic development incentives
served a public purpose, the Maready court reviewed other North
Carolina precedent, including Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial
Development Financing Authority.4 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Mitchell ruled the Industrial Facilities Financing Act,
which authorized the state to issue revenue bonds in order to finance
the construction of private corporate facilities, unconstitutional. In
doing so, the Supreme Court of North Carolina joined the Supreme
Courts of Nebraska, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington in holding the issuance of revenue bonds to private
corporations to be unconstitutional. 6  The Supreme Court of
Nebraska reasoned that "general benefit to the economy of a
community does not justify the use of public funds of the city unless it
be for a public [purpose] as distinguished from a private purpose."57
According to the Maready court, the court in Mitchell "rightly
concluded that direct state aid to a private enterprise, with only
limited benefit accruing to the public, contravenes fundamental
51. Id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also followed
this statement of the law in Peacock v. Shinn in 2000, in which a taxpayer challenged the
constitutionality of the construction of the Charlotte Coliseum. Peacock v. Shinn, 139
N.C. App. 487, 493, 533 S.E.2d 842, 847 (2000) ("Under the second prong of the public
purpose guidelines, activities are considered constitutional so long as they primarily
benefit the public and not a private party.").
52. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
53. Id. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
54. See id. at 717, 467 S.E.2d at 621 (discussing Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin.
Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968)).
55. Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 156, 159 S.E.2d at 758.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 152, 159 S.E.2d at 756 (citation omitted).
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constitutional precepts."58 The Maready court distinguished the case
before it from Mitchell by noting that the primary effect of the
Industrial Facilities Financing Act was to benefit private enterprises,
whereas the challenged economic development incentives statute in
Maready was to yield ultimate public benefit. 9
Furthermore, the Maready court's analysis of Mitchell sheds
additional light as to why the court held the challenged statute in
Maready to be constitutional. First, the Maready court noted that the
General Assembly in Mitchell passed the Industrial Facilities
Financing Act reluctantly, whereas the General Assembly in Maready
passed the economic development incentives statute
enthusiastically.6' Juxtaposing the statute at issue to the one in
Mitchell, the Maready court stated, "[t]he converse is true here in that
the Assembly has unequivocally embraced expenditures of public
funds for the promotion of local economic development as advancing
a public purpose."'" The Maready court placed emphasis not on the
weighing of public benefits versus private benefits but on the
legislature's zeal between the Maready development incentive act and
the Mitchell Industrial Facilities Financing Act.62 Second, the court
acknowledged that its ruling amounted to a shift in constitutional
interpretation despite the differences in the facts of the two cases.
The Maready court reasoned that, with the "passage of time and
accompanying societal changes," the ruling in Mitchell would change
to allow government to "provide a site and equip a plant for private
industrial enterprise."63 In doing so, the court acknowledged the
developing "trend" of expanding the scope of the public purpose
doctrine in North Carolina.'
Consistent with Maready, the Blinson court also ruled economic
development incentives do not violate the public purpose doctrine
58. Maready, 342 N.C. at 718, 467 S.E.2d at 622.
59. Id. at 718, 725, 467 S.E.2d at 622, 625 (distinguishing Mitchell by noting that, in
that case, private industry was the primary benefactor and "any benefit to the public [was]
purely incidental").
60. Id. at 717-18, 467 S.E.2d at 621-22.
61. Id. at 717-18, 467 S.E.2d at 622.
62. See McKnight, supra note 41, at 310 ("[T]he Maready majority opinion outlined
another factor for courts to consider when determining whether a governmental
expenditure is for a public purpose: the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
legislation.").
63. Maready, 342 N.C. at 720, 159 S.E.2d at 623.
64. See id. at 722, 467 S.E.2d at 624. See infra Part IV for a discussion of this
broadening of the scope of the public purpose doctrine in North Carolina.
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embodied in the North Carolina state constitution.65 Indeed, the
court of appeals in Blinson could not distinguish the case from
Maready, holding "[w]e are bound by Maready ... and, therefore,
affirm the trial court's decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint."66
The Blinson court stated that Maready conclusively held public
expenditures for economic development incentive programs to be a
constitutional public purpose.67 Applying the public purpose doctrine
relating to economic development incentives, the Blinson court
confirmed that "[t]he task of the judiciary is to determine whether the
aim of the legislation is primarily public and not to weigh the public
benefit against the private benefit by making findings as to the
projected monetary value of each."'  Therefore, the Blinson court
stated that it could consider the legislative documents-such as the
text of the Computer Legislation, the County and City Resolutions,
and the agreement with Dell-when determining whether the
economic development incentives given to Dell were for public
purposes. 69 Such considerations would help the court assess whether
the asserted aim was to benefit the public. Through review of the text
of the legislation and asserted purposes of benefiting the public, the
court found that the aim and primary motivation behind the statute
was for public benefit and therefore constitutional.7 °
III. BLINSON'S FAILURE IN APPLYING THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
DOCTRINE
The Blinson court correctly stated the law of the public purpose
doctrine but incorrectly applied the law when analyzing the
constitutionality of economic development incentives. Specifically,
the Blinson court incorrectly applied the second prong of the
Madison Cablevision test, because it followed the holding in Maready
and thus exercised improper deference to the state legislature.
65. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 330, 651 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 339, 651 S.E.2d at 276.
68. Id. at 340-41, 651 S.E.2d at 277-78 (citing Maready, 242 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at
625) ("We look instead to whether the purpose of 'an act will promote the welfare of a
state or local government and its citizens.' ").
69. Id. at 336, 340, 651 S.E.2d at 275, 277-78 ("The task of the judiciary is to
determine whether the aim of the legislation is primarily public.").
70. See supra note 18 (listing the seven asserted public purposes for which the
Computer Legislation was enacted). "Thus, under Maready, the need to offer economic
incentive programs to attract industry that will replace lost jobs is necessarily a public
purpose." Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 339, 61 S.E.2d at 276.
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Maready, however, was simply the first step in the misapplication of
the Madison Cablevision test, and thus Blinson was wrong to rely on
the Maready court's analysis.7" Additionally, the court fully ignored
another Supreme Court of North Carolina case, Briggs v. City of
Raleigh,72 which announced a balancing test in order to guide the
court's determination of the appropriate level of deference to the
legislature.73
As established in Madison Cablevision, it is the ultimate
responsibility of the court to determine whether a municipality's
action benefits the public, as opposed to private parties.74 Under this
second prong, activities are considered constitutional "so long as they
primarily benefit the public and not a private party."75 Any benefit to
the private entity can only be incidental.76
The Blinson court erred when it dismissed the claim without
evaluating whether the public benefits exceeded the private benefits.77
The petitioner's brief asserted various factual arguments
demonstrating that the private entity, Dell, primarily benefited from
the economic development incentives, and the benefit to the public
was only incidental.7" First, the petitioner's brief argued that the
primary benefit is to Dell and to Dell employees, as the franchise and
sales tax subsidies, transportation infrastructure, and tax credits and
refunds go directly to the corporation. 9 Granted, this alone would
not fail the test of constitutionality, because "the mere fact that the
71. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. Maready's incorrect decision
affected the lower courts in North Carolina. If Maready had correctly applied precedent,
then Blinson would have as well. Blinson, however, followed Maready and was incorrectly
decided.
72. 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597 (1928).
73. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
75. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 724, 467 S.E.2d 615, 625 (1996)
(emphasis added).
76. See id. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 625 ("While private actors will necessarily benefit
from the expenditures authorized, such benefit is merely incidental."); see also Peacock v.
Shinn, 139 N.C. App. 487, 494, 533 S.E.2d 842, 847 (2000) (holding Charlotte's erection,
maintenance, and operation of the Charlotte Coliseum constitutional because the activity
provided only an incidental private benefit and served a primary public goal).
77. See Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 340-41, 651 S.E.2d 268, 277-78 (2007),
appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E. 2d 240 (2008) ("The task of the judiciary is to
determine whether the aim of the legislation is primarily public and not to weigh the
public benefit against the private benefit.").
78. See Plaintiff Appellants' Brief, supra note 1, at 25-27; see also Fox, supra note 26,
at 482 (arguing in the context of tax incentives given by cities for the building of sports
stadiums, that there are massive private benefits given to these business which dwarf the
"speculative benefits to the public").
79. See Plaintiff Appellants' Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
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agreements benefited private parties [is] not dispositive." ° However,
the fact that the tax benefits go directly to the corporation is one
factor among many that could be used to argue that the primary
benefit is to the private actor, not the public. Second, the incentive
package includes a reimbursement of property taxes for the next
fifteen years, tax credits against Dell's corporate income, and a refund
of sales and use taxes paid on building materials and equipment
added to the new Dell facility."' Therefore, the legislation's asserted
purpose in gaining increased tax revenue from the corporation holds
less weight since there will be little public benefit from property tax,
corporate tax, or sales and use tax collections for an extended period
of time. 2 Third, as then North Carolina Supreme Court Justice
Robert Orr stated in the Maready dissent, the creation of new jobs
and a higher tax base does not automatically result in a significant
benefit to the public. 3 Justice Orr, who was the petitioner's attorney
in Blinson, argued in dissent that there is no evidence to support this
assumption of a public benefit due to an increased tax base.84 None
of these issues were considered by the court.8 These are issues that
should be addressed before ruling whether an economic development
incentive package is constitutional under the public purpose doctrine.
Madison Cablevision, as correctly interpreted in Maready, requires
the court to determine whether the public primarily benefits from the
Dell incentives.
86
Factually, the Blinson court did not analyze the package reports
presented to the state and local governments outlining the purported
public benefits.8 7 Petitioner sought to highlight several economic
issues that would point to the conclusion that the Dell incentive
package was primarily for a private purpose.8 For example, the
80. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 340, 651 S.E.2d at 277 (noting that benefits to private
individuals alone are insufficient to make out a claim under the North Carolina public
purpose clause).
81. See Plaintiff Appellants' Brief, supra note 1, at 24-25 (stating that, with cash
grants and reimbursements from local governments, Dell would not pay property taxes for
the next fifteen years and would possibly have reduced taxes for up to twenty-five years).
82. The state will receive some tax benefit because employees of the corporation will
be paying state taxes. However, this is of minimal benefit to the state when compared to
the large tax credits granted to the corporation since the employees are paid so little, some
less than $20,000 a year. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
83. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 735, 467 S.E.2d 615, 631 (1996)
(Orr, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 341, 651 S.E.2d at 278.
86. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
87. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 338, 651 S.E.2d at 276.
88. Plaintiff Appellants' Brief, supra note 1, at 24-25.
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package consisted of a tax credit up to 100% of corporate income and
corporate franchise tax liability, foregone tax revenue, and a refund
of sales and use taxes paid.89 The briefs filed by the respondents
contained no discussion relating to an analysis performed by the
legislature of the actual public benefits received from the Dell
incentive package. 9°
Another issue the court could have evaluated to determine if the
action primarily benefited the public was to conduct a review of
legislative reports of actual past economic development incentive
programs to see if the associated package reports correctly estimated
the public benefits.91  An analysis of past economic incentive
development projects could have revealed whether the reports met or
failed to meet the expectations for the public (community growth,
increase in jobs, increase in tax base, etc.). Such a review ensures that
the legislature does not automatically defer to the reports and studies
performed by the "very private corporation that stands to benefit
from" these economic development incentives.92
While purporting to uphold North Carolina precedent, in reality,
the Blinson court did not apply the correct precedent. It appears
from the Blinson ruling that in order for an economic development
incentive package to survive state constitutional challenges, the
legislation merely has to assert that the legislation's purpose is to
benefit the public.93  According to North Carolina precedent,
however, the test is to determine whether a state or local
government's action actually does primarily benefit the public or
primarily benefit a private actor, not merely whether the aim of the
legislation was to benefit the public.94 In Briggs v. City of Raleigh,95
the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed whether taxpayer
money used to finance the construction of a state fairground was
89. Id.
90. Defendant Appellees' Brief of the Local Defendants, Blinson v. State, 186 N.C.
App. 328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007) (No. COA06-1258); Brief for State Defendant-Appellees,
Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007) (No. COA06-1258); Brief of
Defendant-Appellee Dell, Inc., Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007)
(No. COA06-1258).
91. See Fox, supra note 26, at 514 (discussing the public purpose doctrine as it relates
to public financing of sports stadiums). Fox suggests courts should look at other cities that
have financed sports stadiums and convention centers and whether those projects have
meet expectations for public benefit. Id.
92. Id. at 515.
93. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 341, 651 S.E.2d 268, 278 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
94. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
95. 195 N.C. 223,141 S.E. 597 (1928).
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being used for a public purpose and, thus, constitutional.96 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina announced a balancing test where
the "ultimate advantage" to the public must outweigh advantages to
the private entity.97 Only when the outcome of this balancing test is
unclear should the court defer to the legislature.98 Subsequently, in
1968, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Mitchell applied this
constitutional test, holding that an enactment is unconstitutional "[i]f
... an enactment is in fact for a private purpose, ... [and] it cannot be
saved by legislative declarations to the contrary."99  Therefore, an
enactment or incentive development does not pass constitutional
muster simply because the legislature declares it to be for a public
purpose. The action must also be in fact for a public purpose.
The Briggs balancing test is consistent with the second prong
established by the Madison Cablevision court. Under Madison
Cablevision, "the ultimate net gain or advantage must be the
public's."' l The private advantages, however, must be incidental." 1
Accordingly, the second prong of Madison Cablevision is essentially
the same balancing test as established in Briggs where the court must
ensure the public benefits outweigh the private benefits.0 2 Taken
together, long-standing North Carolina precedent, beginning with
Briggs in 1928, continuing to Mitchell in 1968, and culminating in
Madison Cablevision in 1989, requires reviewing courts to make the
determination whether public advantages do in fact outweigh the
private benefits.
Starting with Maready and then Blinson, the North Carolina
courts misapplied Madison Cablevision and ignored Briggs altogether
by neither properly applying the second prong of the Madison
Cablevision test nor performing the balancing test. The Maready
court "eyeball[ed]' ' 03 the second prong and understood it as merely
stating that an act that promotes the welfare of a state or a local
96. Id. at 225, 141 S.E. at 599.
97. Id. at 226, 141 S.E. at 600 (quoting Town of Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178
(1877)); see also Martin v. N.C. Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175 S.E.2d 665, 673 (1970)
(directly citing Briggs by stating the ultimate net gain must be the public's).
98. Briggs, 195 N.C. at 226, 141 S.E. at 600.
99. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750
(1968) (emphasis added).
100. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 646, 386 S.E.2d 200,
207 (1989) (quoting Martin, 277 N.C. at 43, 175 S.E.2d at 672-73).
101. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 725, 467 S.E.2d 615, 625
(1996).
102. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
103. McKnight, supra note 41, at 315.
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government and its citizens is for a public purpose."°  The court
performed no analysis to determine whether the asserted public
benefits of the Maready economic development incentives-increase
in population, increase in taxable property, increase in tax revenues,
etc.-outweighed the private benefits to the corporations.105 As one
commentator stated, the court inappropriately assumed "that
economic development and job creation carried a far greater benefit
to the public as a whole than to the individual companies who also
profited from the government's actions in those cases.'1°6  The
Blinson court then relied upon Maready in its application of the
second prong of Madison Cablevision. 7 The Blinson court, in blindly
following Maready, also failed to perform a balancing test to
determine whether the public primarily benefits from the
incentives. 8 Instead, the Blinson court merely cited Maready by
stating, "[t]he public advantages are not indirect, remote, or
incidental; rather, they are directly aimed at furthering the general
economic welfare of the people of the communities affected.' 
°
The Blinson court gave too much deference to the legislature.
Under Madison Cablevision, the legislative determination that the
economic development incentive package granted to Dell was
constitutional is "entitled to great weight.""'  Although some
deference to the legislature is appropriate, the "ultimate advantage"
to the public must outweigh advantages to the private entity... and
that determination must be made by the court.12 Moreover, it is an
interesting fact that the economic development incentive package
offered to Dell was only considered in a special one-day session of the
104. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
105. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 335-41, 651 S.E.2d 268, 274-78 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008). Because Maready involved only the
challenge of the economic development incentive statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1
(2007), the legislature did not in fact evaluate the outweighing of public versus private
benefits. The Maready court stated, "[t]he expenditures this statute authorizes should
create a more stable local economy by providing displaced workers with continuing
employment opportunities, attracting better paying and more highly skilled jobs, enlarging
the tax base, and diversifying the economy." Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625
(emphasis added).
106. McKnight, supra note 41, at 315-16.
107. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 337-38, 651 S.E.2d at 275-76.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 337, 651 S.E.2d at 275.
110. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 645,386 S.E.2d 200,
206 (1989).
111. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina General Assembly.113 In this session, a senior budget
adviser for Governor Easley "repeatedly told legislators that any
changes to the package would kill the deal for the plant and a
projected 1,500 jobs.""' 4 Critics of economic development incentives
suggest that legislative determinations may be "more political than
economic. 11 5 It is possible that politicians have a strong interest in
emphasizing the creation or retention of jobs in the state without
appropriately considering the economic costs of a package, and courts
should be aware of these political circumstances when deciding
whether to defer to the legislature. The courts are charged with the
ultimate responsibility to ensure a particular tax expenditure
primarily benefits the public."6
A number of academics have proposed different considerations
courts should use in applying the balancing test of Briggs and the
second prong of the Madison Cablevision test. For example, one
scholar suggests that courts should analyze empirical data and
"require a clear benefit to the public before deciding [whether] an
expenditure is for a public purpose.""' 7 In reviewing the cost-benefit
analysis, courts should be aware of the false assumption that benefits
can be measured only by looking at the projected increase in the tax
base alone. 8 This assumption is incorrect because only a portion of
the new jobs go to local residents and the unemployed.1 9 Courts also
need to ensure that the legislature has considered other important
factors in the cost-benefit analysis such as environmental costs, the
quality of the new jobs, and who is being hired for those new jobs.12°
The courts should not ignore these considerations.
The Blinson court looked only to whether the aim of the
legislation was for a public purpose and did not ensure the legislature
performed an adequate analysis of whether the incentives were in fact
for a public purpose.21 To rely merely on the stated aim of the
legislation is an example of improper judicial restraint. Simply
because the legislation supporting the economic development
113. See Craver, supra note 4.
114. Id.
115. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives For Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 402 (1996).
116. Id.
117. McKnight, supra note 41, at 316.
118. See Bartik, supra note 11, at 146.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 149-50.
121. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 340-41, 651 S.E.2d 268, 277-78 (2007), appeal
dismissed, 362 N.C. 355, 661 S.E.2d 240 (2008).
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incentive packages states a public purpose does not make the actual
packages given to private entities constitutional under the second
prong of the Madison Cablevision test. Pursuant to the Madison
Cablevision two-prong test, the court has the ultimate responsibility
of determining whether the public primarily benefited from these
incentives.
122
IV. BROADENING OF THE DOCTRINE
The Blinson case is just one example of the continued erosion of
the public purpose doctrine in North Carolina."z3 As reflected in both
Maready and Blinson, the North Carolina courts have begun
providing extreme deference to legislative judgment, essentially
abdicating judicial responsibility under the state constitution to
invalidate legislative undertakings that violate the public purpose
doctrine. 24 Accordingly, the continued broadening of the scope of
the public purpose doctrine as reflected in Blinson represents
improper judicial restraint and reflects the trend of inadequate
judicial protection against unconstitutional government action.
Since the public purpose doctrine was first discussed in North
Carolina in the 1887 case Wood v. Commissioners of Oxford,25 the
North Carolina courts have continued to expand the scope of what
constitutes a "public purpose.' '126  The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has stated that "a slide-rule definition to determine public
purpose for all time cannot be formulated.12' 7 This statement appears
to be the origin of the deferential nature of judicial review present in
122. See Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 646, 386 S.E.2d
200, 207 (1989) ("[T]he ultimate net gain or advantage must be the public's .... " (quoting
Martin v. N.C. Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (1970) (citations
omitted))).
123. The Blinson court followed Maready in holding economic development incentives
are constitutional under the North Carolina public purpose doctrine, departing from the
well reasoned analysis found in Mitchell. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Part III.
125. 97 N.C. 227, 230-34, 2 S.E. 653, 655-56 (1887) (holding the use of public funds to
issue bonds and make a donation for the purpose of railroad construction constitutional
under the public purpose doctrine).
126. See McKnight, supra note 41, at 295-98, 306-12; see also Maready v. City of
Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 721-22, 467 S.E.2d 615, 623-24 (1996) (listing North
Carolina courts where activities have been held to be for a "public purpose" and
acknowledging a "trend toward broadening the scope of what constitutes a valid public
purpose").
127. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750
(1968).
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public purpose decisions.'28 However, North Carolina courts have
consistently stated the correct public purpose test, which is that the
"ultimate advantage" to the public must outweigh advantages to the
private entity.'29 With each case subsequently evaluating whether a
particular undertaking is in violation of the public purpose doctrine,
the North Carolina courts "have permitted an increasing number of
activities to qualify as a public purpose."'30 The broadening of the
definition of "public purpose" by itself does not necessarily mean that
the courts have improperly applied the public purpose doctrine, but it
does suggest the development of a troubling trend of improper
deference to the legislature in North Carolina.'
Many state legislators would argue that the broadening of the
scope of the public purpose doctrine is a positive development and
that economic development incentives are important today because
so many other states are competing for these businesses to locate in
their states. 32  State officials note that North Carolina has been
transitioning from a furniture, textiles, and tobacco industry to one
based on technology, health sciences, pharmaceuticals, and financial
services, and North Carolina must play the "incentives game" in
order to maintain a competitive business environment.'33 This
argument can be used by legislatures to justify the broadening of the
public purpose doctrine, because economic development incentives
will arguably benefit the public by attracting businesses to the state.
As Justice Orr asserted in his Maready dissent, "it is evident from a
wide range of sources included in the record that the primary
argument for such assistance to private industry is that 'all the states
are doing it' and, thus, that North Carolina must do it too in order to
be competitive. 13 4 The argument that "all the states are doing it" is
unrelated to the issue of whether the use of economic development
128. Id. (noting that the legislature's determination of what constitutes a "public
purpose" is "entitled to great weight").
129. See Briggs v. City of Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 226, 141 S.E. 597, 600 (1928); see also
Maready, 342 N.C. at 716, 467 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 144,159 S.E.2d
at 750 (1968)); Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 646, 386
S.E.2d 200, 207 (1989) (quoting Martin v. N.C. Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175 S.E.2d
665, 672-73 (1970)).
130. McKnight, supra note 41, at 294.
131. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 115; see also Maready, 342 N.C. at 725-26, 467 S.E.2d
at 626-27 (stating "courts in forty-six states have upheld the constitutionality of
governmental expenditures and related assistance for economic development incentives"
and citing the cases in the other states upholding economic development incentives).
133. See Craver, supra note 4.
134. Maready, 342 N.C. at 738, 467 S.E.2d at 633 (Orr, J., dissenting).
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incentives in a particular situation can withstand a constitutional
challenge. More than asserting that "all states are doing it," courts
need to ensure the public benefits of economic development
incentives are well reasoned and qualified. The public purpose
doctrine of the North Carolina constitution requires courts to use a
far greater level of scrutiny to protect and ensure public funds are
used for public purposes.
Although courts and commentators have stated many legal
arguments in order to analyze the respective roles of the judiciary and
the legislature in making decisions regarding economic development
incentives, policy arguments also creep into the debate at certain
points. On one hand, the corporations do create new jobs. Dell
agreed that it would employ 1,500 people in Winston-Salem. 35
Google committed to create as many as 210 new jobs at a new plant in
Lenoir. 36 As a part of the incentive package given to Dole Foods, the
company is expected to employ 500 people in Gaston County. 137 The
state granted incentives to Goodyear in order to keep a plant that
employs 2,750 people in Fayetteville, North Carolina.'38 There are
various social and economic benefits resulting from new jobs-
employment rates increase, earnings for local residents increase from
moving to better-paying jobs in a tighter local labor market, property
values increase, and the tax base increases for the state and local
governments.39
On the other hand, some argue that economic development
incentives offered by state and local governments represent bad
economic policy. Critics note that, when states participate in
economic development incentive programs, they are engaged in a
''race to the bottom," in which states begin to adopt policies contrary
to their citizens' interest in an effort to attract new jobs and new
investment. 140 This leaves all states who participate in the economic
development incentives game with greatly diminished tax revenue for
135. See Vollmer, supra note 5.
136. Jonathan B. Cox, Legislative Panel to Look at Incentives to Lure Jobs, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 1, 2007, at D3.
137. See Vollmer, supra note 5.
138. Jonathan B. Cox, Goodyear May Get Top Incentive: Lawmakers Could Authorize
a Substantial Award for Fayetteville Tire Maker Next Week-If They Override Gov.
Easley's Veto, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 8, 2007, at D1.
139. See Bartik, supra note 11, at 140,143.
140. See Enrich, supra note 115, at 380 ("Interstate competition is healthy up to a
point, but it can also reach a pitch at which the costs of competition outweigh the
benefits.").
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critical government services such as education.'41 This "race to the
bottom" results from states engaging in "bidding wars" in order to
attract businesses to the state,'142 and since 1995, North Carolina has
actively participated in this "bidding war.'
'1 43
Economic incentives also drain essential tax revenue from the
state and local governments.'" A nonprofit group cited a North
Carolina Department of Revenue report showing that tax breaks
offered under North Carolina's tax incentives diverted $79.1 million
in taxes the businesses would have otherwise owed in 2004 alone.
145
Furthermore, critics note that business interests dominate the debate
regarding economic incentives, and policymakers often overstate the
benefits and understate the costs of economic development
incentives. 46 Costs and benefits associated with these packages are
often speculative. As noted by Professor Enrich in an article
discussing state tax incentives given to businesses, the "measurement
of [the] net costs to the state is problematic," because the costs are
often indirect and involve uncertainty.147 It is difficult to measure the
costs associated with foregone revenues, increased demands on the
state's infrastructure, and the potential for increased costs of labor
and land to other businesses located in the state.1" Additionally,
many of the jobs created are low paying; for example, some of the
jobs at Dell will pay less than $20,000 a year.149 As such, critics note
there will be little in the way of an increased state income tax benefit
resulting from low paying jobs.15°
141. See id. at 466-67 ("Although a particular state may reap temporary benefits by
offering a particular incentive, over time, the incentive competition erodes the states'
collective ability to derive tax revenues from major portions of the business
community .... ).
142. See id. at 380. But see Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate
Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REv. 447, 451-52 (1997) (arguing
there is no "race to the bottom" as empirical studies that seek to evaluate this "race to the
bottom" are inconclusive).
143. See Craver, supra note 4 (reporting that North Carolina has bid against other
states in an effort to attract FedEx Corp., Nucor Corp., DuPont Corp., R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., Merck & Co., and Dell, Inc. into the state).
144. See Enrich, supra note 115, at 413.
145. David Rice, Businesses in N.C. Don't Pay Excessive Taxes, Group Says,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Nov. 12, 2005, at B1.
146. See Bartik, supra note 11, at 140.
147. Enrich, supra note 115, at 402.
148. Id.
149. Vollmer, supra note 5. One of the amendments enacted in the Computer
Legislation allowed Dell to pay less than the previous average annual wage required and
still receive the tax credits. Craver, supra note 4.
150. See Bartik, supra note 11, at 145 (stating that benefits of an incentive package will
be reduced if it involves lower paying jobs). Interestingly, there has not been universal
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As a means of reviewing these and other policy positions, the
North Carolina General Assembly recently set up a joint select
committee in 2007 to review the financial incentives given to the
corporations. 1' According to paperwork for the committee, the
members of the committee are to examine whether "the extent that
benefits generated from companies that get incentives exceed their
costs" and whether there are "safeguards that ensure the state gets
more than it gives."'152  It seems troubling that this panel was
established in 2007, after the incentives were approved and given to
both Dell and Google. The legislature should have addressed these
very issues when approving the incentive packages, and the reviewing
courts should not have deferred to the legislature in finding the
economic development incentives as being constitutional if this cost-
benefit analysis did not occur.153 It is unclear if the legislature
adequately analyzed whether the benefits to the public exceeded the
benefits to the private entities prior to approving the incentives given
to Dell.154 Furthermore, under the public purpose doctrine, the courts
have the responsibility to make the final determination of whether
the benefits do in fact exceed the costs.
Because this issue has become so highly publicized and political,
there is increased pressure on the courts to abdicate responsibility for
determining whether the action primarily benefits private entities or
support by North Carolina legislators for the use of economic development incentives.
Two lawmakers have tried to garner support for an interstate pact or a congressional
crackdown to end the use of economic development incentives. See Op-Ed., supra note 2
(noting that Representatives Phillip Frye and Pryor Gibson have tried to assess whether a
pact to stop the "bidding war" among states to lure businesses is feasible).
151. Cox, supra note 136. For public documents relating to the committee, see North
Carolina General Assembly-Joint Select Committee on Economic Development
Incentives, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/DocumentSites/browseDocSite.asp?nlD=29
(last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
152. Cox, supra note 136.
153. See Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morgantown, 305 N.C. 634, 645, 386
S.E.2d 200, 206 (1989) (noting that, according to the two-prong test, the legislature should
have already analyzed whether the benefits to the public exceed the costs prior to granting
the package).
154. The cost-benefit analysis at the state legislative level may have been inadequate,
as the North Carolina General Assembly approved the Computer Legislation in a special
one-day session (held in November 2004), and the facts disclosed in the opinion and briefs
reference no specific cost-benefit analysis of the actual incentives given to Dell performed
at the state legislative level. See Craver, supra note 4; see also Plaintiff Appellants' Brief,
supra note 1, at 4; Defendant Appellees' Brief of the Local Defendants, supra note 90, at
4-5. The Dell incentive package itself was passed in November 2004 and was decided at
the county level after the Computer Legislation was enacted. See Plaintiff Appellants'
Brief, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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the public.155 The courts are reluctant to second guess legislators on
legislation that aims to benefit the community. Yet this pressure
should not prevent the courts from properly applying the balancing
test established in Briggs and Madison Cablevision to determine
whether the public benefits outweigh the private benefits.
The continuing erosion of the public purpose doctrine in North
Carolina can also have more severe consequences beyond using
public funds to benefit corporations. As argued by one scholar, the
application of the public purpose doctrine by the courts has led to
qualifying an increasing number of activities as a public purpose, a
practice that can dangerously cross into state eminent domain
powers.156 The U.S. Supreme Court noted in Kelo v. City of New
London'57 that the government, through the Fifth Amendment power
of eminent domain, may condemn the private property of one party
and grant the property to another party, as long as it is "rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose." '158 The outcome turned on
whether the City's development plan served a "public purpose,"'59
and the Court ruled that the redevelopment plan was for a public
purpose.6 ' Thus, according to the most recent ruling on the public
purpose doctrine in North Carolina, Blinson would stand for the
proposition that the State may condemn private property for a
corporation for the purpose of economic development.
CONCLUSION
Erosion of the public purpose doctrine in North Carolina, as
reflected by the cursory judicial review of state and local government
action in Blinson, has rendered the doctrine "inadequate to safeguard
public funds from abuse by private interests."'' As required by long-
standing North Carolina precedent established in Briggs and Madison
Cablevision, the judiciary must make the determination that a state or
155. See Order, Blinson v. State, No. 05 CVS 8378 (Super. Ct. Wake County May 12,
2006), available at http://www.ncicl.org/assets/uploads/brief/2006.05.10-dell-trial-order.pdf
("This issue is a political question best addressed to the legislature. The legislature sets
the policy of the State.").
156. See McKnight, supra note 41, at 293, 316-17 (arguing that the ruling in Maready
"appear[s] to permit economic development as a justification for taking private property
under the state's eminent domain laws").
157. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
158. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 480 ("[Wlhen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States
at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation
of public use as 'public purpose.' ").
160. Id. at 490.
161. McKnight, supra note 41, at 294.
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local government action primarily benefits the public and not a
private party, and the public purpose doctrine as established by this
precedent serves as necessary protection against unconstitutional
government action. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina should review the reasoning in
Blinson, or even the underlying case of Maready, and correctly
balance the public benefits with the private benefits resulting from
economic development incentive packages given to Dell. At a
minimum, the North Carolina courts should confirm that the
legislature has adequately performed a cost-benefit analysis to ensure
the public primarily benefits from the economic development
incentives, not the corporations.
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